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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ____________ 
 




 TERRI LEE HALDERMAN, a retarded citizen, by her mother 
and guardian, Winifred Halderman, LARRY TAYLOR, a 
retarded citizen, by his parents and guardians, Elmer 
and Doris Taylor; KENNY TAYLOR, a minor, a retarded 
citizen, by his parents and guardians, Elmer and Doris 
Taylor; ROBERT SOBETSKY, a minor, a retarded citizen, 
by his parents and guardians, Frank and Angela 
Sobetsky; THERESA SOBETSKY, a retarded citizen, by her 
parents and guardians, Frank and Angela Sobetsky; NANCY 
BETH BOWMAN, a retarded citizen, by her parents and 
guardians, Mr. and Ms. Horace Bowman; LINDA TAUB, a 
retarded citizen, by her parents and guardians, Mr. and 
Mrs. Allen Taub; GEORGE SOROTOS, a minor, a retarded 
citizen, by his foster parents, William and Marion 
Caranfa, all of the above individually and on behalf of 
all others similarly situated; THE PARENTS AND FAMILY 
ASSOCIATION OF PENNHURST; PENNSYLVANIA ASSOCIATION FOR 
RETARDED CITIZENS; JO SUZANNE MOSKOWITZ, a minor, by 
her parents and next friends, Leonard and Nancy 
Moskowitz; ROBERT HIGHT, a minor, by his parents and 
next friends, John and Jeanne Hight; DAVID PREUSCH, a 
minor by his parents and next friends, Calvin and 
Elizabeth Preusch, and CHARLES DiNOLFI, on behalf of 
themselves and all other similarly situated,  
 
     Plaintiffs-Intervenors 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
 




 PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL; DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
WELFARE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; FRANK S. 
BEAL, Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare; 
STANLEY MEYERS, Deputy Secretary for Mental 
Retardation, Department of Public Welfare; HELENE 
WOHLGEMUTH, Former Secretary, Department of Public 
Welfare; ALDO COLAUTI, Executive Deputy Secretary, 
Department of Public Welfare; WILBUR HOBBS, Deputy 
Secretary for Southeastern Region, Department of Public 
  
Welfare; G. DUANE YOUNGBERG, Superintendent, Pennhurst 
State School & Hospital; ROBERT SMILOVITZ, Former 
Assistant Superintendent Pennhurst State School & 
Hospital; JOSEPH FOSTER, Assistant Superintendent, 
Pennhurst State School & Hospital; MARGARET GREEN, 
BETTY UPHOLD, ALICE BARTON, P.E. KILICK, DR. PAROCCA, 
HELEN FRANCIS, employees and agents of Pennhurst State 
School & Hospital; JOHN DOCTOR, JAMES NURSE, JANE AIDE, 
JILL THERAPIST, RICHARD ROE, JANE DOE, unknown and 
unnamed staff, employees and agents of Pennhurst State 
School & Hospital, each individual Defendant sued 
individually and in his or her official capacity; 
GEORGE HETZGER, JOSEPH CATANIA, and ROGER BOWERS, 
Commissioners for Bucks County; ROBERT STREBL, EARL 
BAKER, and LEO McDERMOTT, Commissioners for Chester 
County; FAITH R. WHITTLESEY, CHARLES KELLER, and 
WILLIAM SPINGLER, Commissioners for Delaware County; A. 
RUSSELL PARKHOUSE, FRANK W. JENKINS and LAWRENCE H. 
CURRY, Commissioners for Montgomery County; MAYOR FRANK 
L. RIZZO and THE CITY COUNCIL OF PHILADELPHIA, as 
Authorities for Philadelphia County; PETER 
BODENHEIMBER, Mental Health/Mental Retardation 
Administration for Bucks County; WILLIAM A. McKENDRY, 
Mental Health/Mental Retardation Administrator for 
Chester County; P. PAUL BURRICHTER, Mental 
Health/Mental Retardation Administrator for Delaware 
County; HERMANN A. ROTHER, Mental Health/Mental 
Retardation Administration for Montgomery County, and 
LEON SOFFER, Mental Health/Mental Retardation 
Administration for Philadelphia County, 
 
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant 
 ____________ 
 
 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. No. 74-cv-01345) 
 ____________ 
 
 Argued December 19, 1994 
 
 Before:  GREENBERG, SAROKIN and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 





Jerome J. Shestack, Esquire (ARGUED) 
Barry M. Klayman, Esquire 
WOLF, BLOCK, SCHORR and SOLIS-COHEN 
12th Floor Packard Building 
15th & Chestnut Streets 
Philadelphia, PA  19102-2678 
 
Attorneys for Appellant, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
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WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal from the inclusion of specific items in 
a grant of attorneys' fees and expenses growing out of a contempt 
proceeding, we hold that no payment is due for time spent in 
public relations efforts.  Thus, we will disallow those fees as 
well as those for duplicative work.  Other claims that were not 
supported by evidence at a hearing on fees or that were 
improperly inflated because the tasks performed were easily 
delegable to personnel with substantially lower hourly rates, 
will also be denied. 
 In 1985, after years of negotiation, the parties 
reached a settlement in this suit brought to require appropriate 
care for mentally retarded citizens in Pennsylvania.  A consent 
decree was entered, but it was not long before the controversy 
  
erupted again.  In 1987, the plaintiff-class filed a motion to 
have the court hold the City of Philadelphia and the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania in contempt for failing to adhere to the terms of 
the consent decree.  Extended efforts at settlement resulted in 
an agreement in 1991.  However, this attempt also failed to 
resolve the dispute, and plaintiffs renewed their 1987 motion.  
After a hearing in 1993, the district court found the City and 
the Commonwealth in contempt in an opinion reported at Halderman 
v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 154 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  
 Plaintiffs' counsel then applied for fees and expenses.  
After some negotiation, David Ferleger, Esquire, who had 
represented the class, agreed to accept $260,000 and that matter 
is not at issue.  After a hearing, the court awarded fees to the 
Association of Retarded Citizens of Pennsylvania for the services 
of its counsel, who had also participated in the proceedings on 
behalf of plaintiffs.  The court directed that the City and the 
Commonwealth each pay $222,239.25 to cover the Association's 
attorneys' fees and expenses.  Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. 
& Hosp., 855 F. Supp. 733, 746 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  Only the 
Commonwealth has appealed. 
 An award of fees and expenses in this case is 
permissible under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and under the court's inherent 
power to reimburse a party for outlays incurred in securing an 
adjudication of contempt.  Robin Woods, Inc. v. Woods, 28 F.3d 
396, 400-01 (3d Cir. 1994).  The formula for awarding fees in the 
contempt context is usually the more generous.  In that setting, 
the innocent party is entitled to be made whole for the losses it 
  
incurs as the result of the contemnors' violations, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses.  Id.; see Chambers v. 
Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. 
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258 (1975).   
 The Commonwealth has raised five objections to specific 
items included in the district court's computations.  We will 
discuss them seriatim. 
 I. PUBLICITY EFFORTS  
 The Association's counsel sought compensation for 
seventy hours of "work related to writing press releases, 
speaking with reporters and otherwise publicizing the contempt 
motion."  The district court observed that the litigation was 
over "an important public issue, i.e., the habilitation of 
mentally retarded citizens" but reduced the requested number of 
hours to 36.5 as being the maximum amount that the Association 
could reasonably recover for this activity.  The total amount 
awarded for publicity efforts was $7,375.00.   
 In Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169 
(4th Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals rejected a 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
claim for fees for public relations efforts "to sway public 
opinion and influence State policy-makers to change [the 
defendant's police] enforcement policies."  Id. at 176.  The 
Court commented that "[t]he legitimate goals of litigation are 
almost always attained in a courtroom, not in the media."  Id. 
 In another § 1988 case, Hart v. Bourque, 798 F.2d 519, 
523 (1st Cir. 1986), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
approved the disallowance of time "spent on arrangements for 
  
lectures or publications about the case."  Similarly, in Greater 
Los Angeles Council on Deafness v. Community Television of S. 
Cal., 813 F.2d 217, 221 (9th Cir. 1987), the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that fees for lobbying and publicity 
claimed under the Rehabilitation Act and the Equal Access to 
Justice Act were properly disallowed by the trial court. 
 However, in a Title VII employment case, Davis v. City 
& County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1992), 
vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993), 
the same Court of Appeals affirmed an award for counsel's "time 
spent in giving press conferences and performing other public 
relations work."  The district court had defended the allowance 
as a valid effort to obtain the support of elected officials that 
was vital to obtaining a consent decree.  The Court of Appeals 
concluded that because private attorneys perform public relations 
work in connection with their representation of private clients, 
civil rights attorneys may do so as well.  We find the Davis 
opinion somewhat inconsistent with the Court's earlier views in 
Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness and are not persuaded by 
its reasoning.   
 The fact that private lawyers may perform tasks other 
than legal services for their clients, with their consent and 
approval, does not justify foisting off such expenses on an 
adversary under the guise of reimbursable legal fees.  We are 
more impressed with the reasoning in Rum Creek Coal Sales that 
the proper forum for litigation is the courtroom, not the media.  
It is particularly inappropriate to allow public relations 
  
expenses in the case at hand while it was pending before the 
district judge who had approved the consent decree and subsequent 
settlement agreement.  The allowance of $7,375.00 must, 
therefore, be disapproved. 
 II.  FEES FOR ESCORTING EXPERTS 
 The Association submitted a request of $200 per hour 
for lead counsel's time spent accompanying non-testifying experts 
on various site visits.  In other instances, this function was 
carried out by a paralegal at $60 per hour.  The district court 
concluded that the hours spent were "reasonable and necessary to 
the outcome of the contempt litigation."  
 We have cautioned on a number of occasions that when a 
lawyer spends time on tasks that are easily delegable to non-
professional assistance, legal service rates are not applicable.  
We cannot condone "the wasteful use of highly skilled and highly 
priced talent for matters easily delegable to non-professionals."  
Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 677 (3d Cir. 1983); 
Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 Even the use of a paralegal for the work described in 
this claim at $60 per hour appears to be questionable.  However, 
it has not been challenged, and we will not rule on it.  In any 
event, we are persuaded that a disallowance of $3,780.00, as 
suggested by the Commonwealth, should be granted. 
    III.  AWARD OF EXPENSES FOR NON-TESTIFYING EXPERTS 
 The Association submitted a claim for $13,662.73 in 
fees and costs expended in retaining three non-testifying 
experts, and $9,040.00 for an additional expert who did testify.  
  
All of the experts purportedly toured class-member sites, 
interviewed class members, researched and evaluated records, and 
prepared reports.  The district court awarded $9,040.00 for the 
testifying expert, but allowed only a total of $4,622.73 for the 
remaining experts, apparently in the belief that the entire claim 
for experts was $13,662.73.  Actually, the total claim for 
experts, including the one who testified, was $22,702.73.   
 Approval of the testifying expert's fees in the amount 
of $9,040.00 has not been challenged on appeal, and the 
Commonwealth objects only to the claim for the three non-
testifying expert witnesses.  The district judge found their 
participation "indispensable to this case" and, relying on 
equitable powers to remedy the contempt rather than on 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988, allowed the $4,622.73 collective sum.  We agree that 
granting reimbursement fees of this nature would be proper in a 
contempt action and, therefore, need not discuss the § 1988 
issues.   
 The difficulty here, however, is the lack of 
evidentiary support for the district court's ruling on the work 
of the non-testifying experts.  At oral argument, the 
Association's counsel correctly conceded that there was no 
support presented at the fee hearing for the necessity of the 
experts' consultations, nor is there any evidence to account for 
the services that they performed.  Consequently, the award of 
$4,622.73 for the expenses attributable to those witnesses who 
did not testify cannot be sustained.  
 IV.  ATTORNEY CONSULTATION WITH EXPERTS 
  
 Similarly, the court approved $40,107.59 for the time 
that plaintiffs' counsel spent in consulting with those experts, 
finding that a substantial amount of time was required to 
interview class members as well as to research and evaluate their 
medical and habilitation records.  The burden of proof is on the 
party claiming reimbursement.  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 
1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990).  Despite the fact that the 
Commonwealth had objected to this particular request, the 
Association never demonstrated why these activities were 
necessary.  Although an allowance might well have been proper, 
once again, plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence at the 
hearing convened to resolve these issues.  Therefore, the 
Association has not sustained its burden.   
 We will not grant the Commonwealth's request in full, 
however, because it appears that it overlaps, to some extent, the 
$3,780.00 fees for escorting experts discussed in Section II.  We 
will, therefore, deduct $3,780.00 from the $40,107.59, thereby 




 V.  DUPLICATION OF EFFORT 
 The Commonwealth contends that there was extensive 
duplication of legal services by the Association's counsel and 
Mr. Ferleger.  Two specific instances submitted for our 
consideration are (1) the dual attendance at depositions by the 
Association's counsel and by Mr. Ferleger, and (2) counsel's 
  
failure to coordinate their work in the extensive preparation of 
proposed findings of fact, resulting in two separate submissions 
rather than a single consolidated one.   
 In many cases, the attendance of additional counsel 
representing the same interests as the lawyers actually 
conducting the deposition is wasteful and should not be included 
in a request for counsel fees from an adversary.  See Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).  The fact that a private 
client may accede to the practice and pay the additional fees 
does not necessarily make them reasonable nor necessary when they 
are to be paid by the other party to the proceedings.  We do not 
meet the issue here, however, because the Commonwealth did not 
raise it in the district court.  See Student Pub. Interest 
Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. AT&T Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436, 
1454 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 However, the failure of counsel to coordinate their 
efforts in the preparation of the findings of fact was 
challenged, and we therefore will consider it.  The district 
court found that both sets of requests for findings were non-
repetitious and helpful and that it appeared that counsel had 
made a conscious effort to be non-duplicative.   
 Mr. Ferleger submitted findings of 132 pages.  
Principal counsel for the Association testified at the hearing in 
the district court that she had filed proposed findings of 131 
pages as well.  She conceded that "we never discussed filing a 
single joint proposed findings" and defended the practice of 
separate submissions throughout the proceedings because different 
  
parties were being represented.  Perhaps there may have been a 
justification for that procedure during some phases of the 
litigation, but we are unable to discern the necessity of 
preparing uncoordinated, separate findings when the interests of 
those representing the retarded citizens were identical.   
 We have examined the requests for findings and are 
convinced that coordination between counsel would have reduced 
the total time required for preparation.  Redundant review of the 
record by both counsel and the drafting of parallel requests is 
wasteful in a situation like this, and some sort of cooperation 
should have been employed.   
 We therefore conclude that the Commonwealth's request 
for a fifty-percent reduction in the 154 hours it asserts the 
Association's principal counsel spent in preparation of the 
findings of fact should be granted.  The Association has not 
questioned the amount of time allocated to that task, and 
therefore, we accept the Commonwealth's computation.  We thus 
conclude that the record requires a disallowance in the amount of 
$15,400.00 for the redundant work in preparing proposed findings 
of fact. 
 VI.  ACROSS-THE-BOARD REDUCTION 
 The Commonwealth contends that the lodestar should have 
been reduced by 20% across-the-board because plaintiffs obtained 
substantially less relief than they sought.  The district court 
disagreed and concluded that "plaintiffs achieved substantially 
all of the relief they requested and to which they were entitled 
and with the exception of the [disallowed items], the relief 
  
obtained by the plaintiffs justified the amount of time 
expended."  On review of objections to specific items in the 
plaintiffs' fee schedule, the district court reduced the 
$554,842.01 originally requested by $110,363.51 and permitted a 
total of $444,478.50.   
 Because it had conceded in the district court that it 
was not in compliance with all of the terms of the settlement 
agreement, the Commonwealth contends that this was not a "risky" 
case and the only real issue was the scope of the remedy.  We 
note, however, that the concession was not made until the outset 
of the hearing -- after the plaintiffs' work was substantially 
completed.  The trial judge expressed his surprise in responding 
to defendants' counsel, "You're telling me it was a slam dunk.  I 
wished I had realized the first day I saw you in this courtroom 
that this was going to be a slam dunk. . . . [N]obody told me at 
that juncture that . . . [you were] admitting liability or I 
would have said:  Fine, the hearing is over."  
 The reality is that both liability and remedy were 
contested and that the district court did grant very substantial 
relief to plaintiffs.  We are not persuaded that the district 
judge erred in rejecting an across-the-board reduction and, 
instead, choosing to evaluate specific items in the fee requests. 
 VII.  CONCLUSION 
 Granting the following expenses was inconsistent with a 
proper exercise of discretion and will be disallowed as listed: 
 $7,375.00  Publicity 
 $3,780.00  Escorting Experts 
  
 $4,622.73  Non-Testifying Experts' Expenses 
 $36,327.59 Attorney Consultation with Experts 
 $15,400.00 Duplication of Services 
              
 $67,505.32 TOTAL REDUCTION OF AWARD 
Because the fees were to be evenly divided between the 
Commonwealth and the City of Philadelphia, the award of counsel 
fees and expenses against the Commonwealth will be reduced by 
$33,752.66.   
  
 The case will be remanded to the district court for 
modification of the judgment against the Commonwealth by reducing 
it to $188,486.59.  In all other respects, the judgment of the 
district court will be affirmed. 
_________________________________ 
 
